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Abstract
This paper uses the search and matching framework to explore the
impact of employed job search on the labour market. The speci¯c features
of our model are endogenous employed job search, °ows in and out of the
labour force, endogenous job destruction and heterogenous job creation.
Also, job °ows and workers °ows do not coincide as we allow for job-to-job
°ows, ¯rms' churning of workers and labour force entries and exits.
Employed job search is shown to have a substantial impact on unem-
ployment dynamics but a negligible one on the level of unemployment.
More on-the-job search leads to lower unemployment in°ow and out°ow,
i.e. a more stagnant unemployment pool. With employed job search,
the stock of vacancies is more cyclically sensitive, the unemployment out-
°ow less cyclically sensitive and the unemployment in°ow more cyclically
sensitive than without employed job search.
With our model, the impact of a change in unemployment bene¯t does
not only occur through the conventional decrease in the unemployment
out°ow rate, but also through an increase in the unemployment in°ow
rate.
The calibrated version of our model replicates well the cyclical be-
haviour of job and worker °ows observed in the data.
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11 Introduction
There is much evidence that a large fraction of new hires comes from the ranks
of the employed. On-the-job search has been identi¯ed (Burgess, 1993, Pis-
sarides, 1994) as having an impact on unemployment equilibrium as well as
on the dynamics of the labour market. Job °ows and worker °ows have been
documented to be large, even in an economy in a steady-state, and exhibit dif-
ferent behaviour over the business cycle (Burda and Wyplosz, 1994, Davis and
Haltiwanger, 1992). Importantly, these °ows are not identical. Job creation
and job destruction do not coincide with unemployment in°ows and out°ows.
This is because workers move from job to job, in and out of the labour force,
and ¯rms churn workers. These churning °ows and labour force °ows have been
shown tobe large and sensitive to the business cycle (Burgess, Lane and Stevens,
2000, Burda and Wyplosz, 1994). Hence it seems useful to incorporate these
features into a model of unemployment to understand the impact of on-the-job
search °ows and labour force °ows on unemployment °ows, job creation and
job destruction.
In this paper, we use the Mortensen-Pissarides framework and extend it to
include the above features1. On-the-job search, job creation and job destruction
are all endogenous. Workers are allowed to °ow into and out of the labour force
at an exogenously determined rate, and we are able to look at the impact of the
size of these °ows on unemployment equilibrium. These °ows are thought to be
mainly `demographic' °ows of individuals either retiring or joining the labour
force when leaving education. These new entrants then have to be `processed'
by the labour market in that they have to ¯nd a match with a vacant job and
that they create congestion on the workers' side of the labour market while they
search. Importantly, jobs quit by individuals retiring or moving to another job
are not necessarily destroyed. Firms are heterogenous and the value of their
output is decomposed in terms of a common aggregate component and an id-
iosyncratic component. The idiosyncratic component is subject tounanticipated
shocks. In section 4, anticipated shocks to the aggregate component are also
considered. Vacancies themselves are heterogenous2 and all but the marginal
vacancy are pro¯table. They o®er heterogeneous wages, which justi¯es on-the-
job search for some workers. Wages are determined by Nash bargaining at the
time of the match and are kept ¯xed after the match, even when either an id-
iosyncratic or an aggregate shock occurs. In steady state, job destruction occurs
after idiosyncratic shocks. Because wages are ¯xed at the time of the match,
the probability of job destruction rates is heterogenous across ¯rms.
1Pissarides (1994) introduced on-the-job search into his model, but kept job desctruction
exogenous. Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) made job destruction endogenous, but did not
consider on-the-job search. Mortensen (1994) allowed for endogenous job destruction and
on-the-job search, but assumed that all jobs quit were destroyed, hence job °ows and worker
°ows coincide.
2As opposed to vacancies in the standard model which are all posted at the maximum
productivity and all make zero pro¯t. As a result, in the standard model, there is a unique
potential wage rate at the match for all job seekers, i.e. no wage distribution at the time of
the match.
2The main results of the paper are as follows: the presence of on-the-job
search has a substantial impact on labour market equilibrium. More on-the-job
search leads to lower matching probability for workers, i.e. a lower unemploy-
ment out°ow rate and also to a lower layo® rate, i.e. a lower unemployment
in°ow rate. The net e®ect on the unemployment stock is negligible. Only the
dynamics of unemployment are a®ected as the unemployment pool has become
more stagnant. As predicted by Burgess (1993), on-the-job search renders un-
employment in°ow rate more sensitive to the cycle and unemployment out°ow
rate less sensitive to the cycle. In all cases, the in°ow rate is found to be more
cyclically sensitive than the out°ow rate, suggesting that most unemployment
dynamics occur through this channel. This con¯rms empirical results for Great
Britain by Burgess and Turon (2000). The number of employed job seekers is
very sensitive to the cycle and positively correlated with it. Also, the presence
of on-the-job search decreases the impact of changes in unemployment bene¯t
on unemployment duration. Such changes are shown to have a considerable
impact on the job destruction rate.
The calibrated version of our model matches empirical facts well: unemploy-
ment °ows are countercyclical, job °ows are countercyclical and worker °ows
are procyclical. It hence reconciles the di®erent behaviours over the business
cycle of job °ows and worker °ows.
We derive the model in the next section and present the calibration and the
results in section 3. In section 4, we introduce aggregate shocks into the model
and see how the anticipation of aggregate shocks by ¯rms and workers changes
the results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Model
Our model builds on the Mortensen-Pissarides framework and incorporates on-
the-job search3. We also introduce some °ows in and out of the labour force. We
do not model the out-of-the-labour-force state and keep these °ows exogenous.
Garibaldi and Wasmer (2001) analyse these °ows in more depth, but without
considering on-the-job search4. In our model, the °ows in and out of the labour
force are exogenous and assumed to be both equal to s times the stock of the
employed, stE. The stock of the labour force is constant and normalised to
1. The labour force in°ow represents new entrants coming from education and
re-entrants coming back after a career break. All labour force entries °ow into
unemployment. The labour market, through the matching mechanism, has to
`process' these workers before they ¯nd a match. The labour force out°ow rep-
resents retirements and individuals going onto career breaks. For simplicity,
all labour force exits occur from the state of employment. As documented by
Burda and Wyplosz (1994) both these labour force °ows occur in fact to and
3See Pissarides (2000) or Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) forthe derivation of the original
model.
4An interesting extension of both models would include endogenous on-the-job search and
labour force entries and exits as both features are shown to a®ect unemployment dynamics.
3from both states of employment and unemployment, in cyclically sensitive pro-
portions. But their evidence supports that total labour force °ows are roughly
constant over the cycle.
2.1 Firms
The value of the output produced by ¯rms is decomposed into two components:
the aggregate component, p, which is held constant in this section (we will allow
for aggregate cyclical shocks in section 4) and the idiosyncratic component of
price, ², which is uniformly distributed over the interval (¡1;1) and subject to
idiosyncratic shocks. When ² is above some threshold jcit is worthwhile opening
a vacancy. ² is subject to idiosyncratic shocks occurring at rate º. These shocks
are not anticipated by either ¯rms or workers. The wage is negotiated at the
time of matching and is not re-negotiated after either an idiosyncratic shock
to ² or an aggregate shock to p. This absence of renegotiation is documented
by Hall (1999, pp.1155-6) and leads to ine±cient layo®s and quits. When the
idiosyncratic component of price is below some threshold ojs the worker will
¯nd it worthwhile to be searching on the job and the ¯rm knows this. So the
state value of a vacancy will have a di®erent expression when ² is in the range
(jc;ojs), denoted Vo, from when ² is in the range (ojs;1), denoted Vn, because
the state value of the ¯lled job with a non-searching worker, Jn, is di®erent
from the state value of a ¯lled job with an on-the-job searcher, Jo. Vacant
jobs have a probability ¸ of being matched with a job searcher, determined
by the matching function (see section 2.3). We assume that all vacant jobs
have the same probability of being matched, irrespective of their idiosyncratic
productivity ². We also assume that, while jobs are vacant, they are not subject
to idiosyncratic shocks.
r ¢Vo (²) = ¡k + ¸¢ (Jo (²) ¡ Vo (²)) (1)
r ¢ Vn (²) = ¡k + ¸¢ (Jn (²) ¡ Vn (²)) (2)
where r is the discount rate and k the per-period cost of opening a vacancy. As
in the Pissarides model, vacant jobs are created until the exhaustion of rents.
What is di®erent here is that all vacancies but the marginal one will make a
positive pro¯t5. The job creation threshold is determined as:
Vo (jc) = 0 (3)
As seen above, when the idiosyncratic price component is in the interval
(jc;ojs), the job will be ¯lled by a worker who will carry on job-searching.
5In Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), all new jobs were created at the same idiosyncratic
productivity - forwhich the pro¯tsfrom avacancy iszero. Here, jobs are created over a range
ofidiosyncratic productivities (jc;1)and the pro¯ts from avacancy are zeroatjcand positive
over the rest of the range. In den Haan et al. (2001, pp. 8-10), new matches are `accepted' by
workerand ¯rmaslong as the relationship-speci¯c productivity isgreaterthan some threshold
for which the joint surplus of the match is zero. Blanchard and Diamond (1989, p.9) already
suggested that, in the short run, the pro¯ts from a vacancy were not necessarily zero.
4The ¯rm hence expects the job to become vacant again, with probability ¹
(the matching probability for workers). It also expects the worker to leave the
labour force with probability s6. When the job becomes vacant it keeps its level
of idiosyncratic productivity ². The state values of a job ¯lled with a worker
searching on the job, Jo (²), and of a job ¯lled by a non-searching worker, Jn (²),
are:
r ¢ Jo (²) = p + ² ¡ wo (²) + (s + ¹) ¢ (Vo (²) ¡ Jo (²)) (4)
r ¢ Jn (²) = p + ² ¡ wn (²) + s ¢(Vn (²) ¡ Jn (²)) (5)
The wage negotiated with a worker continuing job search, wo (²), will be di®erent
from the wage negotiated with a worker who stops searching, wn (²). Wage
determination is detailed in section 2.3. Whether a worker searches on the job
or not does not depend on the worker but on the idiosyncratic productivity of
the job, ². All workers employed in jobs with ² less than ojs will be looking for
another job, whilst no worker employed in jobs with ² more than ojs will be
doing so.
2.2 Workers
The level of the on-the-job search threshold, ojs, is such that expected gains
from search are just o®set by the costs of searching over the expected duration of
search. We assume that employed job searchers have the same matching prob-
ability as unemployed job searchers, ¹. The per-period search cost is denoted
c. Following Jovanovic (1979), we assume that the job match is an experience
good, so the idiosyncratic productivity of the job is unknown to the worker at
the time of the match. Therefore employed job seekers sample all the available
vacancies and their matching probability (¹) as well as their expected value of
employment in their next job (EE) do not depend on the ² in their current job.
For employed workers in jobs with idiosyncratic productivity ² below ojs, the
state value of being employed and searching on-the-job, Eo (²), is therefore:
r ¢ Eo (²) = wo (²) + s ¢ (U ¡ Eo (²)) + ¹ ¢(EE ¡ Eo (²)) ¡ c (6)
As we do not model the out-of-the-labour-force state, we assume that its state
value equals U, the state value of being unemployed. EE denotes the expected












The state value of being employed and not searching, En (²), is:
r ¢ En (²) = wn (²) + s ¢ (U ¡ En (²)) (8)
6Note that in case of retirement or quit to another job, the ¯rm plans to re-advertise the
job. So separations and job destruction are di®erent.
5The idiosyncratic productivity at which workers are indi®erent between con-
tinuing or stopping search is the on-the-job threshold mentioned above and
satis¯es:
En (ojs) = Eo (ojs) (9)
if this gives a solution7 greater than jc. Otherwise ojs = jc and there are no
employed job seekers8.
The state value of being unemployed is:
r ¢U = b+ ¹¢ (EE ¡ U) (10)
where b is the per-period sum of the unemployment bene¯t and the value of
leisure, net of job search costs.
2.3 Wage bargaining and matching
The wage rate is determined by Nash bargaining between worker and ¯rm, as in
the Mortensen-Pissarides framework9. Here, the idiosyncratic productivity of
the job, ², is unknown to the worker at the time of the match. It is only revealed
to him when he starts in the job. So the ¯rm o®ers a wage contract that will,
once ² is observed, share the surplus from the match between worker and ¯rm
according to their bargaining power. From the equations above, we see that the
surplus will have a di®erent expression for jobs in which the worker carries on
searching and in jobs where the worker stops searching. Because the value of
the surplus is only observed once the worker is in the job, we assume that the
worker's outside option is unemployment in both cases10. The two wage rates
wo (²) and wn (²) resulting from the Nash bargaining will satisfy the following
conditions:
¯ ¢ (Jo (²) ¡ Vo (²)) = (1 ¡ ¯) ¢ (Eo (²) ¡ U) (11)
¯ ¢ (Jn (²) ¡ Vn (²)) = (1 ¡ ¯) ¢ (En (²) ¡ U) (12)
where ¯ is the worker's share of the surplus.
7En(²) and Eo(²) are linear functions of ², usually with di®erent slopes, so equation (9)
will lead to a unique solution.
8In fact, there is a range of values of ² over which workers would like to be paid the non-
searching wage wn but still carry on searching. If job search is unobservable by the ¯rm, this
may occur and ¯rms may consider that these workers do search and pay them a wage wo.
Workerswould howeverprefernottosearch and get paid wn. Sooverthis range, incentives are
desirable to stop workers from quitting. There is (anecdotal) evidence that ¯rms discourage
quits in some cases by paying lump sums or bonuses on the condition that the worker stays
within the ¯rm. We hence assume that job search does not occur above the threshold ojs.
9There hasbeen a growingliterature on alternative models of wage determination over the
pastdecade, particularlymodelswith wage-posting games(see Mortensenand Pissarides, 1999
for a survey). Here, wage dispersion is obtained with Nash bargaining wage determination.
10Because the worker who has quit his previous job does not have the option to go back to
it.
6Firm heterogeneity, embodied in the variance of ², and labour market fric-
tions, embodied by the matching function, lead to some wage dispersion11. This
dispersion in turn is an incentive for some workers paid at the lower end of the
wage distribution to engage in on-the-job search.
Matches between searching workers and vacant jobs occur at a rate deter-
mined by the matching function, which we assume to exhibit constant returns
to scale. The pool of job searchers comprises all the unemployed job seekers,
stU plus the employed workers engaged in on-the-job search, stOJS:
Number of matches = eff ¢ (stU + stOJS)
(1¡®) ¢stV
® (13)
where eff is the matching e±ciency, ® the matching elasticity with respect to






we have the following expressions for the workers' (¹) and vacancies' (¸) match-
ing probabilities:
¹ = eff ¢ µ
® (15)
¸ = eff ¢ µ
®¡1 (16)
2.4 Job destruction and churning
As mentioned above, the wage rate is negotiated at the time of the match and
held ¯xed thereafter. This means that when the job's idiosyncratic productivity
² (or in section 4 the aggregate component of productivity p) has been hit by a
shock, the wage does not share the match surplus e±ciently anymore, which may
lead to ine±cient quits and layo®s of the type described by Hall (1999). In the
absence of aggregate shocks, idiosyncratic shocks do not impact on the employed
job search decision because they are unanticipated at the time of the match.
Once they occur, the worker has no incentive to alter his search decision as both
his current wage and his potential wage are unchanged. They do however lead to
unanticipated job destruction and layo®s. To see this, we derive the expression
of the state value of a ¯lled job which exhibited an idiosyncratic productivity of
²0 at the time of the match with its worker, leading to a negotiated wage w (²0),
and now exhibits an idiosyncratic productivity of ² after a shock. This new ²
is drawn from a uniform distribution between ¡1 and 1. The expression of this
state value is di®erent whether the worker engages into job search or not:
r ¢J2o (²;²0) = p + ² ¡ wo (²0) + (s + ¹) ¢ (Vo (²) ¡ J2o (²;²0)) (17)
r ¢J2n (²;²0) = p + ² ¡ wn (²0) + s ¢(Vn (²) ¡ J2n (²;²0)) (18)
11Following Burdett and Mortensen (1998), there are a number of models of equilibrium
wage dispersion with wage-posting¯rms. Forexample, Postel-Vinayand Robin (2002)present
a search model where both workers and ¯rms are heterogenous. They estimate that worker
heterogeneity contributes 0 to 40% of the wage variance, ¯rm heterogeneity 10 to 50% and
labour market frictions about 50%.
7For the ¯rm, an idiosyncratic shock a®ects the productivity of the job and the
value of the vacant job that it might become, but not the wage it pays out to the
worker. If the new idiosyncratic productivity falls below some threshold value,
it will not be pro¯table anymore for the ¯rm to keep the job ¯lled, even though
it has to pay ¯ring costs f to destroy the job. This threshold productivity
depends on the idiosyncratic productivity at which the wage was negotiated
and is denoted jd(²0). It is determined as:
J2o (jdo (²0);²0) = ¡f when ²o < ojs (19)
J2n (jdn (²0);²0) = ¡f when ²o > ojs (20)
As ² is drawn uniformly from the interval (¡1;1) and idiosyncratic shocks occur
at a rate of º, the probability that ajob ¯lled when its idiosyncratic productivity
was ²0 is destroyed equals 0:5 ¢ º ¢ (jdi (²0) + 1). As ²0 is uniformly distributed







(jdo (²0) + 1) d²o +
Z 1
ojs
(jdn (²0) + 1) d²o
¸
(21)
Job destruction only leads to a layo® if the worker has not left the labour force







(1 ¡ s ¡ ¹) ¢
R ojs
jc (jdo (²0) + 1) d²o
+(1¡ s) ¢
R 1
ojs (jdn (²0) + 1) d²o
#
(22)
From the ¯rm's point of view, it may also be that the new idiosyncratic
productivity is such that it is worth laying o® the worker and re-advertising the
job at the current productivity in view of paying the wage rate corresponding
to the new productivity. This happens if ² falls below some threshold ch (²0)
and above jc as it has to be pro¯table to open the vacancy. This threshold is
de¯ned as:
J2o (cho (²0) ;²0) = Vo (cho (²0)) ¡ f when ²o < ojs (23)
J2n (chn (²0) ;²0) = Vn (chn (²0)) ¡ f when ²o > ojs (24)







(cho (²0) ¡ jc) d²o +
Z 1
ojs
(chn (²0) ¡ jc) d²o
¸
(25)
From the worker's point of view, ¯rm's churning only leads to layo® if the
worker has not left the job to leave the labour force or to take another job.







(1 ¡ s ¡ ¹) ¢
R ojs
jc (cho (²0) ¡ jc) d²o
+(1 ¡ s) ¢
R 1
ojs (chn (²0) ¡ jc) d²o
#
(26)
8We can see from the previous equations that worker °ows and job °ows do
not coincide because of job-to-job °ows, labour force entries and exits and ¯rms'
churning.
2.5 Equilibrium
As mentioned earlier in this section, the labour force is assumed to be constant
and normalised to 1, so we have the following identity between the stocks of
employed stE and unemployed stU:
stE + stU = 1 (27)
The stock of vacancies stV is determined by the level of jc, the ² threshold
below which it is not pro¯table to open a vacancy (see equation (3)). As ² is
drawn uniformly from (¡1;1):




where ± is a scaling parameter. All the workers employed in jobs with ² less






The in°ow into unemployment comprises workers °owing in from employ-
ment following job destruction or churning and individuals entering the labour
force:
U inf low = (La + CHw + s) ¢stE (30)
The out°ow from unemployment equals the number of matches coming from
the ranks of the unemployed as workers only leave the labour force from em-
ployment:
Uout°ow = ¹ ¢ stU (31)
The steady-state stock of unemployment is therefore, using (30), (31) and (27):
stU =
La + CHw + s
La + CHw + s + ¹
(32)
With equation (14), the model is now closed.
3 Results
In this section we calibrate the model to obtain a solution that mirrors reality
in terms of the sizes of the various stocks and °ows. The literature gives us
9guidance on the range of values that the various parameters can take. There
are eleven parameters in the model: the per-period cost of opening a vacancy,
k, the per-period cost of searching on-the-job, c, the parameter b measuring the
value of the unemployment bene¯t plus the value of leisure net of search cost
for the unemployed, the discount rate r, the scaling parameter ±, the worker's
share of the surplus in the Nash wage bargaining ¯, the rate at which workers
leave/enter the labour force s, the ¯ring cost f, the rate at which idiosyncratic
shocks occur º, the matching e±ciency eff and the matching elasticity with
respect to vacant jobs ®.
Here we are only concerned with steady states without anticipation of ag-
gregate shocks. These will be introduced in the next section. The dynamic
adjustment of this model over the business cycle is left for future research.
3.1 Calibration
In the calibration process we aim to reach a solution where the stocks of un-
employed and employed jobs seekers are of a similar size and about 10% of the
labour force. This is because there is evidence (Burgess, 1993) that half the
new hires come from the ranks of the employed and we assumed that employed
and unemployed job seekers had the same matching probability. We also aim
for the matching probabilities to be about 0.40 for the job seekers and 0.90 for
the vacant jobs, and for the layo® rate to be about 4% of the labour force12.
We think of the unit time period to be a quarter and use a discount rate r of
0.02. A summary of all parameter values for the base case is shown in Table 1.
Table 1: Parameter values
r ¯ b s k f º eff ® ± c
0.02 0.5 0.6 0.02 0.2 1 0.1 0.6 0.5 0.2 0.05
With these parameter values we obtain a labour market tightness µ of 0.46
and matching probabilities of 0.41 and 0.89 for workers and vacancies respec-
tively. The resulting stocks of unemployed and employed job seekers are respec-
tively 0.13 and 0.12, while the stock of vacant jobs is 0.12. The layo® rate is 0.04
and the churning rate is 0. The average productivity is 1.43 and the wage at
the average productivity is 0.94, which corresponds to a labour share of income
of 66%
3.2 Impact of on-the-job search
In order to assess the impact of the extent of employed job search, we allow the
parameter c to vary, which will have a direct impact on the number of employed
job seekers. Results are reported in Table 2. We see that the stock of employed
12These values were chosen to match data from Great Britain (NOMIS and Burgess and
Turon, 2000).
10job seekers, stOJS, responds negatively to a change in c. Over these three cases,
the elasticity of this stock to the search cost c is -0.5.
Table 2: Impact of on-the-job search
Base c = 0:08 c = 0:02
µ 0.46 0.52 0.42
¹ 0.407 0.433 0.389
¸ 0.885 0.832 0.926
stU 0.127 0.126 0.127
stOJS 0.119 0.086 0.157
stV 0.115 0.109 0.119
La 0.039 0.042 0.036
avge 1.43 1.45 1.40
w (avge) 0.94 0.97 0.91
ls (avge) 0.66 0.67 0.65
avge=(1+jc)/2 is the average productivity. ls(avge)=w(avge)/avge is the labour share at average productivity.
The increase in the number of employed job seekers has a negative impact
on ¹. So the employed job seekers create congestion for the unemployed. There
is a very small impact on the stock of vacancies. The increase in the number
of employed job seekers is accompanied by a decrease in the layo® rate, but
the net e®ect of this decrease and of the decrease in ¹ is no change in the
stock of unemployment. So the stock of unemployment is una®ected by the
change in the stock of employed job seekers, but it is more stagnant as both
in°ow and out°ow are smaller. This agrees with the results of Boeri (1999) who
observes that countries with a high fraction of employed job search exhibit lower
unemployment turnover rates.
3.3 Impact of the business cycle
We now look at the impact of a change in the aggregate price component p.
Results of the model for the base case, an increase in p by 50% and a decrease
in p by 50% are shown in columns 2, 3 and 4 of Table 3. As observed in real data,
the labour market tightness µ, the workers' matching probability ¹, the stock
of employed job seekers stOJS and the stock of vacancies stV are procyclical
while the vacancies' matching probability ¸, the stock of unemployment stU
and the layo® rate La are countercyclical.
The stock of employed job searchers is very sensitive to the business cycle: its
elasticity with respect to p is 1.26 when p increases from 1 to 1.5, and 2.17 when
p decreases from 1 to 0.5. This also suggests a concave relationship between p
and stOJS, whereby, when job opportunities become plentiful, more employed
workers engage into job search but the rate of increase in their number decreases
if the economy is already buoyant. As the matching probability ¹ for workers is
procyclical too, the quit rate will be super-procyclical, as observed in real data.
11Table 3: Impact of business cycle and on-the-job search







µ 0.40 0.46 0.58 0.40 0.74 1.18
¹ 0.379 0.407 0.457 0.379 0.516 0.652
¸ 0.949 0.885 0.788 0.949 0.697 0.552
stU 0.182 0.127 0.082 0.182 0.123 0.091
stOJS 0 0.119 0.194 0 0 0
stV 0.067 0.115 0.160 0.067 0.091 0.107
La 0.064 0.039 0.017 0.064 0.052 0.045
avge 1.16 1.43 1.70 1.16 1.54 1.96
w (avge) 0.83 0.94 1.09 0.83 1.09 1.44
ls (avge) 0.71 0.66 0.64 0.71 0.71 0.73
avge=(1+jc)/2 is the average productivity. ls(avge)=w(avge)/avge is the labour share at average productivity.
Layo®s are countercyclical and exhibit an elasticity of -1.20 with respect
to p. The elasticity of the worker's matching probability ¹, which is also the
unemployment out°ow rate exhibits an elasticity with respect to p of 0.2. As
layo®s account for over half the unemployment in°ow (the remaining part of
the in°ow, coming from out of the labour force, is constant and equal to 0.02)
the unemployment in°ow is more sensitive to the cycle than the unemployment
out°ow. Columns 5 to7 in Table 3 show model results when there is noemployed
job search. Comparing these with results with employed job search shows how
employed job search a®ects the cyclical sensitivity of unemployment °ow rates.
With no employed job search the elasticity of layo®s with respect to p is -0.37
(instead of -1.20 with employed job search) and the elasticity of the workers'
matching probability ¹ with respect to p is 0.53 (instead of 0.20 with employed
job search). So we see that the presence of employed job search renders the
unemployment in°ow rate more sensitive to the cycle and the unemployment
out°ow rate less sensitive to the cycle, as predicted by Burgess (1993).
The stock of vacancies stV is procyclical and exhibits an elasticity of 0.8
with respect to p when there is employed job search (0.44 without employed job
search) while the stock of unemployment stU is countercyclical and exhibits an
elasticity of -0.79 with respect to p (-0.74 without employed job search). This
corresponds to the often observed negative correlation between unemployment
and vacancies over the business cycle -the Beveridge curve. The fact that the
stock of vacancies is more sensitive to the cycle when there is employed job
search agrees with Pissarides's (1994) ¯ndings. He also ¯nds that employed
job search renders unemployment less cyclically sensitive, which we do not as
elasticities are about equal.
With employed job search, we also observe that the stock of vacancies is
more cyclically sensitive than the unemployment out°ow rate ¹ (the respective
elasticities are 0.8 and 0.2). This is explained by the fact that, when there are
more vacancies around, more employed workers engage into job search attracted
12by these increased opportunities and they `crowd out' unemployed workers. The
increase in matching probability for the workers is hence less than it would have
been without employed job search. This smoothing e®ect is not present when
there are no employed job searchers: the respective elasticities of the vacancies
stock and workers' matching probability are 0.44 and 0.53.
The last three lines of Table 3 show that both the average productivity and
the average wage are procyclical and that wages are less sensitive to the cycle
than productivity. The labour share of income is hence countercyclical in our
model, which replicates the behaviour of labour share in real data. It should be
noted from the last three columns that, without employed job search, the model
looses the feature of a countercyclical labour share (it is about acyclical).
3.4 Impact of unemployment bene¯t, worker's bargaining
power and idiosyncratic productivity variance
We now turn to the impact of model parameters relevant for policy purposes:
the unemployment bene¯t b, the worker's bargaining power ¯, the variance of
², the idiosyncratic productivity, the rate at which individuals °ow in and out
of the labour force s and the ¯ring costs f. Results are shown in Table 4.
Table 4: Impact of unemployment bene¯t, worker's share, variance of idiosyn-
cratic productivity and labour force °ows
Base b = 0:8 b = 0:4 ¯ = 0:6 ¯ = 0:4 ¾ = 1:3 ¾ = 0:7 s = 0:04 s = 0
µ 0.46 0.42 0.51 0.35 0.69 0.40 0.63 0.43 0.50
¹ 0.407 0.389 0.428 0.355 0.498 0.379 0.476 0.393 0.424
¸ 0.885 0.926 0.840 1.014 0.722 0.949 0.756 0.915 0.849
stU 0.127 0.150 0.107 0.143 0.112 0.137 0.115 0.166 0.086
stOJS 0.119 0.077 0.154 0.183 0.049 0.146 0.062 0.102 0.139
stV 0.115 0.096 0.133 0.116 0.110 0.113 0.111 0.115 0.114
La 0.039 0.049 0.030 0.038 0.043 0.040 0.042 0.039 0.04
avge 1.43 1.52 1.34 1.42 1.45 1.41 1.46 1.42 1.43
w (avge) 0.94 1.08 0.80 0.97 0.94 0.97 0.97 0.93 0.95
ls(avge) 0.66 0.71 0.60 0.68 0.65 0.67 0.66 0.65 0.67
avge=(1+jc)/2 is the average productivity. ls(avge)=w(avge)/avge is the labour share at average productivity.
Columns 3 and 4 show the impact of a change in the unemployment bene¯t
b: An increase in b leads to an increase in stU and a decrease in ¹ as predicted by
unemployed job search theory. Here, the model also predicts that an increase
in b has a large impact on the job destruction and layo® rates. In the wage
bargaining, the workers' outside option, U, is worth more when b is higher, so
the negotiated wage rate will be higher. The consequence is that some jobs with
low idiosyncratic productivity ² will now not be pro¯table anymore. In other
words, the job creation threshold jc will be higher and less vacancies will be
advertised. For the same reason, the job destruction thresholds jd(²0) will be
13higher, so the probability that the idiosyncratic productivity falls below that
threshold after a shock will be higher, hence the higher job destruction and
layo® rates. A consequence of this is that the average productivity is positively
correlated with unemployment bene¯t, as in den Haan et al. (2001, p.21). If
we compare the impact of an increase in unemployment bene¯t on workers'
matching probability and layo® rate by comparing their elasticities with respect
to b, we obtain -0.14 and 0.72 respectively. So the impact on the layo® rate
is much larger than the impact on ¹, which means that most of the impact of
b on stU occurs through its impact on the unemployment in°ow rate rather
than on the out°ow rate. As the matching probability is lower and the variance
of job opportunities is lower, employed job search is much less attractive: the
elasticity of stOJS with respect to b is -0.97. This means that the congestion
on the workers's side of the labour market eases and ¹ increases, although not
enough as to completely o®set its initial decrease. The impact of unemployment
bene¯t on unemployment exit rate is hence smaller in the presence of employed
job search. There is a large literature on the impact of unemployment bene¯t on
unemployment duration. Narendranathan, Nickell and Stern (1985) estimated
the elasticity of unemployment duration for men with respect to unemployment
bene¯t to be in the range 0.28 to 0.36. Our model predicts this elasticity to be
0.14.
In columns 5 and 6, a rise in the worker's share of the surplus in the Nash
bargaining ¯ by 20% is shown to lead to a substantial (50%) rise in employed job
search and a decrease (by 12%) of the workers' matching probability ¹. Layo®s
are una®ected so the stock of unemployment itself increases by 12%. The stock
of vacancies remains fairly constant, which suggests that most of the impact of
the change in ¯ on unemployment occurs through its impact on employed job
search.
In columns 7 and 8, we look at the impact of a change in the variance of the
distribution of idiosyncratic productivity. We now consider that ² is uniformly
distributed over the interval (¡¾;¾) and vary the value of ¾. An increase in ¾
has a very similar impact on the labour market as an increase in ¯. Again, most
of the ¯nal impact on unemployment occurs through the response of employed
job search to this shock.
In columns 9 and 10, we see that an increase in s leads to a substantial
increase in stU and a substantial decrease in stOJS. A higher s means a higher
in°ow into unemployment, which leads tomore congestion on the workers' side of
the labour market, so a decrease in the workers' matching probability ¹. This,
together with the fact that the rate at which workers leave the labour force
(also s) is higher, renders employed job search less attractive as the probability
of ¯nding a better job is lower and the expected time the worker would be in
that better job before leaving the labour force is shorter. This in turn eases the
congestion on the workers's side of the market and increases ¹ but not enough
to completely o®set the initial decrease in ¹. So the presence of employed job
search lessens the impact on ¹ and hence on stU that a change in s occurs.
Results not shown in the table show that ¯ring costs have very little impact
on the model results. The main e®ect is that, when ¯ring costs are set to zero,
14churning from ¯rms become pro¯table, and we have 1% of the employed being
laid-o® because of ¯rms' churning. As a result, the unemployment rate rises
to 0.149 compared to 0.127 in the base case. Other model results are hardly
a®ected by the change in ¯ring costs. We will see in the next section that
¯ring costs do however have a considerable impact on job destruction following
a negative aggregate shock. In the literature (e.g. Bertola (1990), Millard
(1994), Garibaldi (1998)), ¯ring costs have usually been found to reduce job
reallocation but not to a®ect greatly the level of unemployment itself (except in
Millard (1994) where ¯ring costs increase unemployment). Here, steady state
job reallocation is not much a®ected by ¯ring costs, although it is reduced by
¯ring costs in the direct aftermath of a cyclical shock.
Throughout this section, we have seen that variations in employed job search
following a change in one of the model parameters play a very important role
in the overall impact of this shock on the steady-state level of unemployment.
The presence and sensitivity to various labour market parameters of employed
job search is hence a crucial aspect of the labour market's response to shocks
to institutions or to the economy.
3.5 Job °ows and worker °ows
In our model, job °ows and worker °ows do not coincide. Not all the job
destroyed incur layo®s because some workers either leave the labour force or
take another job. Unemployment in°ows include not only layo®s but also entries
into the labour force. Job creation and unemployment out°ows do not coincide
either as some new jobs (about half of them) are taken by employed job searchers
and because job-to-job moves give rise to new vacancies without job creation
when the ¯rm decides to replace those workers who quit. We present in Table
5 some measures of job °ows and worker °ows in the base case, in a recession
(p = 0:5) and in a boom (p = 1:5).
Table 5: Job °ows and worker °ows
p = 0:5 p = 1 p = 1:5
Job °ows 0.053 0.037 0.018
Layo®s 0.052 0.034 0.016
Separations 0.069 0.100 0.123
U °ows 0.069 0.052 0.034
L °ows 0.016 0.017 0.018
JJ °ows 0.000 0.048 0.089
Worker °ows 0.085 0.117 0.141
JF / WF 0.63 0.31 0.13
UF / JF 1.29 1.41 1.85
JD/separations 0.77 0.37 0.15
U flows: Unemployment inflow and outflow in steady state. L flows: Flows in and out of the labour force.
JJ flows: Job-to-job flows. WF: worker flows. JF: job flows.
15Row 5 of Table 5 shows that our model produces countercyclical unemploy-
ment °ows, consistent with the data presented by Burda and Wyplosz (1994)
for four European countries. Job °ows (row 2) are also countercyclical, whereas
worker °ows (row 8) are procyclical. The ratios in rows 9 and 10 show that
unemployment °ows, worker °ows and job °ows have very di®erent cyclical
behaviour. As mentioned in section 3.3, job-to-job °ows, i.e. quits, are very
procyclical. In our model, job destruction does not coincide with job separa-
tions, as is often assumed in the literature. Indeed, the ratio between the two
(row 11) not only is much smaller than 1, but is very sensitive to the business
cycle, varying from 0.77 in a recession to 0.15 in a boom. So models assum-
ing that all jobs quit are destroyed ignore a signi¯cant aspect of labour market
dynamics.
4 Model with anticipation of aggregate shocks
In this section we consider that the aggregate price component p is subject to
shocks occurring at a rate of q. These shocks are anticipated by both ¯rms and
workers. As before, wages are negotiated at the time of the match and not re-
negotiated thereafter in the event of either an idiosyncratic or aggregate shock
to the job's productivity. The aggregate economy now moves between a state
1 (boom) where p = 1:5 and a state 2 (recession) where p = 1. Jobs created
in state 1 (i.e. for which the wage was negotiated in a boom) are worth J11 in
state 1 and J12 in state 2. For a ¯rm, a negative aggregate shock means that
the price its sells its product at is lower but the wage it pays to the worker is
still the same. As a consequence, some jobs J12 will be destroyed right after
the shock. All jobs with idiosyncratic productivity below some threshold jdcyc
will be destroyed13. From the workers' point of view, there is no incentive to
move from a job J12 as its pay a `boom' wage w1 in a recession. So there is no
employed job search from jobs J12. Vacancies V1 posted in a boom advertise
jobs o®ering a wage w1. When a recession hits, they are all destroyed on impact
and `recession' vacancies V2 are posted, advertising jobs with wages w2. When
they are matched with a worker, jobs J22 are ¯lled. If then a positive aggregate
shock occurs, these jobs are worth J21 and carry on paying `recession' wages. So
workers occupying those jobs always ¯nd it worthwhile to engage in on-the-job
search in order to be paid a `boom ' wage instead. For ¯rms, jobs J21 can sell
their product at a `boom' price while still paying a `recession' wage, so there is
no job destruction on impact. Vacancies V2 disappear on impact and vacancies
V1 are posted in greater number as the new job creation threshold jc1 will be
lower than the `recession' job creation threshold jc2.
For workers, Eij is the value of being employed in a job Jij, i.e. to be
13In simulationsnotreported here, we found thatthethreshold jdcyc, and hence theamount
of job destruction on impactafter a negative shock, isvery sensitive to the level of ¯ring costs
f. So, although f doesnot a®ect the steady states, it a®ects the dynamics between the steady
states, i.e. the speed at which the economy moves from a boom steady state to a recession
steady state. It will not however a®ect the transition from a recession to a boom.
16employed at a wage negotiated in state i while the current state of the economy
is j. The value of being unemployed in a boom and in a recession are U1 and
U2 respectively.
On-the-job search and job destruction in jobs J11 and J22 are determined in
the same way as in the previous section. The equations of the model when we
allow for anticipated aggregate shocks are shown in the Appendix. The model
was solved for several values of q which measures the frequency of aggregate
shocks - or at least the frequency at which ¯rms and workers expect them to
occur. Results are shown in Table 6.
Table 6: Impact of anticipation of aggregate shocks
q = 0 q = 0:02 q = 0:04 q = 0:08
µ1 0.59 0.58 0.53 0.46
µ2 0.46 0.47 0.49 0.53
stU1 0.076 0.082 0.087 0.094
stU2 0.127 0.113 0.111 0.108
stOJS1 0.196 0.182 0.198 0.228
stOJS2 0.119 0.157 0.153 0.136
stV1 0.159 0.153 0.152 0.149
stV2 0.115 0.128 0.129 0.128
La1 0.018 0.021 0.021 0.022
La2 0.039 0.033 0.032 0.033
¹1 0.461 0.457 0.437 0.407
¹2 0.407 0.411 0.420 0.437
It is clear from the results that the fact that agents anticipate an aggregate
shock renders the two steady states of boom and recession closer together in
terms of all our measures of the labour market. As q increases, the boom
economy becomes less of a boom and the recession economy becomes less of
a recession. Anticipation of aggregate shocks smooths aggregate °uctuations.
When q = 0:08, the unemployment stock only varies between 9.4% and 10.8%,
whereas these variations range between 7.6% and 12.7% when aggregate shocks
are not anticipated. The ratio of layo® rates between recession and boom is
2.2 when shocks are unanticipated compared to 1.5 when agents expect an
aggregate shock in the next quarter with a probability of 8%. The ratio of
workers' matching probability between boom and recession is 1.13 when no
shocks are anticipated compared to 0.93 when shocks are anticipated with a
probability of 8%. So even when there is anticipation of aggregate shocks, the
layo® rate remains more sensitive to the cycle than the matching probability.
5 Conclusion
This paper uses the search and matching framework to explore the role of em-
ployed job search on the labour market. With our model, we can analyse its
17impact in terms of unemployment level and dynamics, job creation and job
destruction. The speci¯c features of the model are endogenous employed job
search, °ows in and out of the labour force, endogenous job destruction and
heterogenous job creation. In our model, job °ows and workers °ows do not
coincide as we allow for job-to-job °ows, ¯rms' churning of workers and labour
force entries and exits.
Employed job search is shown tohave a substantial impact on unemployment
dynamics but a negligible one on the level of unemployment. More on-the-job
search leads to lower unemployment in°ow and out°ow, i.e. a more stagnant un-
employment pool. The sensitivity of the labour market to the business cycle is
a®ected too: with employed job search, the stock of vacancies is more cyclically
sensitive, the unemployment out°ow less cyclically sensitive and the unemploy-
ment in°ow more cyclically sensitive than without employed job search. One
consequence is that most unemployment dynamics arise through the in°ow re-
sponse to cyclical shocks.
With our model, the impact of a change in unemployment bene¯t does not
only occur through the behaviour of unemployed job seekers. A higher un-
employment bene¯t leads to less job creation, more job destruction and less
on-the-job search. So we obtain a rise in equilibrium unemployment coming not
only from the conventional decrease in the unemployment out°ow rate, but also
from an increase in the unemployment in°ow rate. The latter e®ect is in fact
stronger than the former. Also, changes in the worker's bargaining power and
in the variance of the idiosyncratic productivity a®ect unemployment mainly
through their impact on employed job search.
The calibrated version of our model matches empirically observed facts well.
The unemployment level and layo®s are countercyclical, the unemployment out-
°ow rate, the stock of vacancies and the number of employed job seekers are
procyclical. Also, wages are less sensitive to the cycle than prices so that the
labour's share of total income is countercyclical.
Our model also does well at replicating the cyclical behaviour of job and
worker °ows. Unemployment °ows are countercyclical, job-to-job °ows (very)
procyclical, job °ows countercyclical and worker °ows procyclical. Two features
of our model are crucial for these results: we allow for employed job search and
jobs that have been quit are not necessarily destroyed.
Given the important role we ¯nd for employed job search in the determina-
tion and cyclical behaviour of labour market equilibrium, it would be interesting
to assess empirically the size of and the main in°uences on employed job search.
For example, recent labour market developments such as decreasing job security
and increased use of ¯xed-term contracts may well have an impact on the num-
ber of employed job seekers, which in turn will a®ect unemployment dynamics.
18Appendix
The expressions of all state values depend on the value of ² as it a®ects the out-
come for the worker/job should the state of the economy change. The matching
probabilities will be di®erent in booms and recessions, respectively ¸1, ¹1 and
¸2, ¹2.
The state value equations for vacancies are:
r ¢ V1o (²) = ¡k + ¸1 ¢ (J11o (²) ¡ V1o (²)) + q ¢(0¡ V1o (²))
when ² in (jc1;ojs1) (A.1)
r ¢ V1n (²) = ¡k + ¸1 ¢ (J11n (²) ¡ V1n (²)) + q ¢ (0 ¡ V1n (²))
when ² in (ojs1;jc2) (A.2)
r ¢ V1n (²) = ¡k + ¸1 ¢ (J11n (²) ¡ V1n (²)) + q ¢ (V2o (²) ¡ V1n (²))
when ² in (jc2;ojs2) (A.3)
r ¢ V1n (²) = ¡k + ¸1 ¢ (J11n (²) ¡ V1n (²)) + q ¢ (V2n (²) ¡ V1n (²))
when ² in (ojs2;1) (A.4)
and
r ¢ V2o (²) = ¡k + ¸2 ¢ (J22o (²) ¡ V2o (²)) + q ¢(V1n (²) ¡ V2o (²))
when ² in (jc2;ojs2) (A.5)
r ¢ V2n (²) = ¡k + ¸2 ¢ (J22n (²) ¡ V2n (²)) + q ¢ (V1n (²) ¡ V2n (²))
when ² in (ojs2;1) (A.6)
For jobs that were ¯lled is state 1, the state values are, in state 1:
r ¢ J11o (²) = p1 + ² ¡ w1o (²) + (s + ¹1) ¢ (V1o (²) ¡ J11o (²)) + q ¢ (0¡ J11o (²))
when ² in (jc1;ojs1) (A.7)
r ¢J11n (²) = p1 + ² ¡ w1n (²) + s ¢ (V1n (²) ¡ J11n (²)) + q ¢ (0 ¡ J11n (²))
when ² in (ojs1;jc2) (A.8)
r ¢J11n (²) = p1 + ² ¡ w1n (²) + s ¢ (V1n (²) ¡ J11n (²)) + q ¢ (V2o (²) ¡ J11n (²))
when ² in (jc2;ojs2) (A.9)
r ¢J11n (²) = p1 + ² ¡ w1n (²) + s ¢ (V1n (²) ¡ J11n (²)) + q ¢ (V2n (²) ¡ J11n (²))
when ² in (ojs2;jdcyc) (A.10)
r ¢J11n (²) = p1 + ² ¡ w1n (²) + s ¢ (V1n (²) ¡ J11n (²)) + q ¢ (J12n (²) ¡ J11n (²))
when ² in (jdcyc;1) (A.11)
and in state 2:
r ¢J12n (²) = p2 + ² ¡ w1n (²) + s ¢ (V2n (²) ¡ J12n (²)) + q ¢ (J11n (²) ¡ J12n (²))
when ² in (jdcyc;1) (A.12)
For jobs that were ¯lled is state 2, the state values are, in state 2:
r ¢ J22o (²) = p2 + ² ¡ w2o (²) + (s + ¹2) ¢ (V2o (²) ¡ J22o (²)) + q ¢ (J21o (²) ¡ J22o (²))
when ² in (jc2;ojs2) (A.13)
r ¢J22n (²) = p2 + ² ¡ w2n (²) + s ¢ (V2n (²) ¡ J22n (²)) + q ¢ (J21o (²) ¡ J22n (²))
when ² in (ojs2;1) (A.14)
19and in state 1:
r ¢J21o (²) = p1 + ² ¡ w2o (²) + (s + ¹1) ¢ (V1n (²) ¡ J21o (²)) + q ¢ (J22o (²) ¡ J21o (²))
when ² in (jc2;ojs2) (A.15)
r ¢J21o (²) = p1 + ² ¡ w2n (²) + (s + ¹1) ¢ (V1n (²) ¡ J21o (²)) + q ¢ (J22n (²) ¡ J21o (²))
when ² in (jc2;ojs2) (A.16)
For workers, the value of being unemployed in state 1 and 2 is:
r ¢ U1 = b + ¹1 ¢ (EE1 ¡ U1) + q ¢ (U2 ¡ U1) (A.17)


























The value of being employed in a job ¯lled in state 1, when the economy is
in state 1 is:
r ¢ E11o (²) = w1o (²) + s ¢(U1 ¡ E11o (²)) + ¹1 ¢ (EE1 ¡ E11o (²)) ¡ c + q ¢ (U2 ¡ E11o (²))
when ² in (jc1;ojs1) (A.21)
r ¢E11n (²) = w1n (²) + s ¢ (U1 ¡ E11n (²)) + q ¢(U2 ¡ E11n (²))
when ² in (ojs1;jdcyc) (A.22)
r ¢E11n (²) = w1n (²) + s ¢ (U1 ¡ E11n (²)) + q ¢(E12n (²) ¡ E11n (²))
when ² in (jdcyc;1) (A.23)
and when the economy is in state 2:
r ¢ E12n (²) = w1n (²) + s ¢ (U2 ¡ E12n (²)) + q ¢(E11n (²) ¡ E12n (²))
when ² in (jdcyc;1) (A.24)
The value of being employed in a job ¯lled in state 2, when the economy is
in state 2 is:
r ¢ E22o (²) = w2o (²) + s ¢(U2 ¡ E22o (²)) + ¹2 ¢ (EE2 ¡ E22o (²)) ¡ c + q ¢ (E21o (²) ¡ E22o (²))
when ² in (jc2;ojs2) (A.25)
r ¢E22n (²) = w2n (²) + s ¢ (U2 ¡ E22n (²)) + q ¢(E21o (²) ¡ E22n (²))
when ² in (ojs2;1) (A.26)
and when the economy is in state 1:
r ¢E21o (²) = w2o (²) + s ¢(U1 ¡ E21o (²)) + ¹1 ¢ (EE1 ¡ E21o (²)) ¡ c+ q ¢ (E22o (²) ¡ E21o (²))
when ² in (jc2;ojs2) (A.27)
r ¢E21o (²) = w2n (²) + s ¢(U1 ¡ E21o (²)) + ¹1 ¢ (EE1 ¡ E21o (²)) ¡ c + q ¢ (E22n (²) ¡ E21o (²))
when ² in (ojs2;1) (A.28)
20The wage rates are determined by Nash bargaining and satisfy the conditions:
¯ ¢ (J11i (²) ¡ V1i(²)) = (1 ¡ ¯) ¢(E11i(²) ¡ U1) (A.29)
¯ ¢ (J22i (²) ¡ V2i(²)) = (1 ¡ ¯) ¢(E22i(²) ¡ U2) (A.30)
for i = o;n.
In this version of the model, ¯ve thresholds have to be determined: jc1, jc2,
ojs1, ojs2, jdcyc with the following equations:
V1o (jc1) = 0 (A.31)
V2o (jc2) = 0 (A.32)
E11o (ojs1) = E11n (ojs1) (A.33)
E22o (ojs2) = E22n (ojs2) (A.34)
J12n (jdcyc) = 0 (A.35)
Job destruction and churning rates are determined as in section 2.4. The
model is closed in a similar fashion as the model without aggregate shock and
we obtain tightness rates µ1 and µ2 for states 1 and 2 of the economy, as well
as the stocks of unemployed, employed job searchers and vacancies.
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